

# **The International Order, International Law, and Climate Intervention**

Jesse Reynolds

University of California, Los Angeles School of Law



# The international order

- Countries (states) as relevant actors
- Sovereignty
- International law is generally voluntary
- States do what is in their interest



# Emissions cuts

- *Global* benefits > costs
- Benefits globally distributed
- Costs local
- *Local* benefits < local costs
- “collective action”
- “free riding”
- Expect suboptimal
- International:
  - Trust / Transparency
  - Commitments?
  - R&D cooperation, tech transfer



# Carbon dioxide removal

- *Global* benefits > costs
- Benefits globally distributed
- Costs local
- *Local* benefits < local costs
- “collective action”
- “free riding”
- Expect suboptimal
- International:
  - Transparency / trust
  - R&D cooperation, tech transfer
  - Accounting & MRV
  - Transboundary impacts





# Adaptation

- Little spillovers
- Local benefits > local costs
- Expect *locally* optimal
- Economic inequality + unequal vulnerability
- Expect suboptimal global distribution
- International:
  - Transfer of knowledge, resources



# Solar geoengineering (SRM)

- Global benefits > global costs
- Financial costs seem so low...
- Local benefits > local costs (for some states)
- 1. “too much”
  - “free driver”
  - Globally supra-optimal
- 2. “too soon”
  - Mutual restraint problem

## The Governance of **SOLAR GEOENGINEERING**

Managing Climate Change  
in the Anthropocene



JESSE L. REYNOLDS

CAMBRIDGE

# International law: rules

- Custom
- Climate regime
  - UNFCCC
  - Kyoto Protocol
  - Paris Agreement
- Convention on Biological Diversity
- Environmental Modification Convention
- UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
- London Convention / London Protocol



# International law: institutions

- Climate regime parties
- CBD Parties
- UN Environment Assembly
- World Meteorological Organization
- IPCC
- UN General Assembly
- UN Security Council

